This letter shows that the interactive DSA batch transaction protocol proposed by Naccache et al. at Eurocrypt'94 is not secure. This letter investigates the security of the interactive batch veri cation of DSA. More precisely, we show that either the signer or the veri er can easily generate a collection of bogus signatures that satis es the batch veri cation criterion. Of course, each of the faked signatures does not satisfy the DSA veri cation condition individually. Consequently the interactive batch veri cation method is not secure at all.
Introduction : The DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) of NIST 1] has received widespread attention these days. At Eurocrypt'94, Naccache et al. 2] proposed various ways to optimize the DSA for smart card applications. These include batch veri cation, inversionless signing and signer-aided compression, etc. Naccache et al. presented two kinds of batch transaction protocols for fast DSA veri cation : interactive batch and probabilistic batch.
This letter investigates the security of the interactive batch veri cation of DSA. More precisely, we show that either the signer or the veri er can easily generate a collection of bogus signatures that satis es the batch veri cation criterion. Of course, each of the faked signatures does not satisfy the DSA veri cation condition individually. Consequently the interactive batch veri cation method is not secure at all.
Description of DSA : Let p; q and g be the DSA public parameters : p a large prime, q a large prime divisor of p ? 1 and g an element in Z p of order q. Let H denote the secure hash algorithm. The signer has a secret key x 2 Z q and a public key y = g x mod p. To generate a DSA signature for message m, the signer randomly picks k 2 Z q and computes fr; sg as r = (g k mod p) mod q; s = k ?1 (H(m) + rx) mod q:
The corresponding veri cation equation for the DSA is r = (g s ?1 H(m) y s ?1 r mod p) mod q: (1) DSA batch transaction : The interactive batch transaction proposed by Naccache et al. consists of the signature collection protocol, where the signer generates n signatures through interaction with the veri er, and the batch veri cation protocol, where the veri er validates these n signatures at a time through the batch veri cation criterion.
(a) Signature collection protocol : For i = 1; 2; : : : ; n; the following steps are performed, where m i denotes the i-th message to be signed.
i) The signer randomly picks k i 2 Z q and sends i = g k i mod p.
ii) The veri er replies with an e-bit message randomizer b i .
iii This scheme is essentially as fast as a single DSA veri cation. Naccache et al. only considered its security against the forgery of a new signature from a set of valid signatures. This is not su cient for the security of the protocol, as we will see below. Our question is : "Can the validity of eqn.(2) guarantee the validity of each of n signatures ?". This is a crucial problem to be clearly settled before the above protocol can be used. The answer is de nitely negative. The following cheating scenario shows that the veri er (anybody, indeed) can easily generate a set of DSA triples It is easily seen that the set of triples f i ; s i ; m i kb i g obtained by the above procedure satis es the batch veri cation criterion (2) . Therefore, the veri er may claim that these faked signatures were generated by the signer. Though none of the triples individually satis es the DSA veri cation equation (1), this claim should be accepted in the interactive batch transaction protocol of Naccache et al.. Of course, the decision made in favor of the veri er just based on the validity of eqn.(2) can be easily subverted by individual veri cations of the signatures. But another cheating scenario described below shows that this cannot resolve disputes. In
Cheating by the signer : For i = 1; 2; : : : ; n?1, the following steps are performed (initially t = 0).
i) The signer randomly picks u i 2 Z q and sends i = g u i mod p.
iii) The signer randomly picks and sends s i 2 Z q and updates the value t as t := t + s ?1 i (H(m i kb i ) + i x) ? u i mod q:
In the last round, the signer interacts as follows :
i) The signer randomly picks u n 2 Z q and sends n = g un+t mod p.
ii) The veri er replies with an e-bit message randomizer b n .
iii) The signer sends s n = u ?1 n (H(m n kb n ) + n x) mod q.
Then the batch veri cation criterion is easily seen to be satis ed. Now that the veri cation holds, the veri er will accept the set of triples fr i = i mod q; s i ; m i kb i g as valid DSA signatures of the signer for messages fm i g. However the signer may deny later these signatures by showing that none of the triples satis es the DSA veri cation condition.
Conclusion : From the above two simpli ed cheating scenarios, we conclude that the interactive batch veri cation method proposed by Naccache et al. is completely insecure. The rst cheating scenario shows that anyone can produce a set of triples satisfying the batch veri cation criterion by himself. In addition, from the second scenario we see that there is no way to determine who is a cheater in case of disputes. This insecurity seems come from the fact that the variables controlling the security of batch veri cation, message randomizers, are xed at the time of signature generation and actually not involved in the signature veri cation procedure. For comparison, the reader may refer to the probabilistic batch veri cation method (see 2] for details) which can provide any required level of security at the expense of computational complexity.
